Executive Summary
Since January 2004, a Malay-Muslim-based insurgency has engulfed the three southernmost provinces in Thailand. More than 4,500 people have been killed and over 9,000 wounded, making it the most lethal conflict in Southeast Asia. Now in its 8 th year, the insurgency has settled into a low-level stalemate. Violence is down significantly from its mid-2007 peak, but it has been steadily climbing since 2008. On average, 32 people are being killed and 58 wounded every month. Most casualties are from drive-by shootings, but there are also about 12 improvised explosive device (IED) attacks a month.
The insurgency is now characterized by less indiscriminate violence and more retaliatory attacks. Insurgents continue to target security forces, government officials, and Muslim moderates who seek accommodation with the Thai state as part of efforts to make the region ungovernable by limiting provision of social services and driving Buddhists from the south. The overall level of violence may be influenced more by insurgent calculations about the optimum amount of violence needed to advance their political goals than by improved capabilities of the security forces.
Despite better coordination, Thai counterinsurgency operations are still hampered by bureaucratic infighting and a lack of professionalism. Human rights abuses by security services with blanket immunity under the Emergency Decree continue to instill mistrust among the local population. Moreover, as long as violence is contained in the deep south, the insurgency will remain a low priority for the new Thai government, which is focused on national political disputes and is reluctant to take on the military by pursuing more conciliatory policies toward the south. Indeed, even under the 30-month tenure of the Democrat Party with an electoral base in the south, the insurgency was a very low priority and its few policy initiatives were insufficient to quell the violence.
The new Pheu Thai government under Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, the younger sister of Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted in a September 2006 coup, will have its hands tied in the south. Its election victory and focus on national reconciliation have already engendered mistrust of the Thai military. The new government will be reluctant to criticize the military's handling of the insurgency, take on the culture of impunity, or push for any form of political autonomy. This will make any devolution of political authority unlikely, limiting chances for a negotiated solution. As a result, low level violence is likely to continue indefinitely.
The most important immediate U.S. objective in Thailand is political stability at the national level and deepening bilateral economic ties. Absent a cohesive Thai government with the political will to overcome military resistance to policies that might address underlying causes of the insurgency, U.S. pressure to do more is likely to be ineffective or even counterproductive.
Introduction
The national elections that took place on July 3, 2011, are unlikely to resolve the intense political polarization that has wracked Thailand since 2006, when Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted in a military coup. Since then, there have been six prime ministers and a series of weak coalition governments that the military has manipulated easily. The elections are also unlikely to lead to any progress in the long-simmering insurgency in the country's three
Muslim majority provinces in the deep south. Indeed, the electoral campaign in the Bangkokcentric nation focused on elite politics, the growing rift between the urban middle class and rural constituents, and the future role of the exiled Thaksin. What was glaringly absent was any serious discussion of the insurgency. The two main parties, the incumbent Democrat Party and opposition Pheu Thai Party, both asserted that they would do better at resolving the insurgency than their rival, but neither party outlined any new initiatives or concrete policies.
The Malay-based insurgency in three southern Thai provinces, Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat, and parts of a fourth, Songkhla, re-erupted in January 2004 and is now in the middle of its 8 th year. Roughly 80 percent of the 1.7 million people in these provinces are Muslims and Melayu speakers. The insurgency has claimed the lives of more than 4,500 people and wounded nearly twice that number in some 11,000 incidents of violence and over 2,000 bombings. In the process, the insurgency destroyed much of the social fabric of southern Thailand, particularly in the countryside. 1 Some 20 percent of the minority Buddhist population has abandoned its land, either fleeing the south altogether or moving into the relatively safe towns. The decentralized and madrassa-based insurgency has confounded the Royal Thai Army (RTA) and other security forces, which have been unable to gain the initiative. Despite 60,000 security forces, Thai baht (THB) 145 billion ($4.9 billion) in expenditures, and the arrest of thousands of alleged insurgents, the violence has continued unabated. There are no signs that the insurgency is actually being defeated. The only country with more IED attacks is Afghanistan.
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was in charge at the start of the insurgency until he But with the demonstrations crushed in May 2010, a more secure government formed, and national elections anticipated in the first half of 2011, an opportunity existed to address conditions in the south. This opportunity was squandered, as the south remained a low priority for the government and a blot on the prime minister's record. In 30 months in office, he made only four 1-day trips to the south, which is less than a 2-hour flight from Bangkok.
During his tenure and campaign, Prime Minister Abhisit consistently stated that the violence in the south was down, implicitly taking credit for the improved situation. For example, on February 7, 2011, Abhisit said, "The government is tackling the problem in the right direction.
The number of violent incidents has clearly decreased, but it's still not satisfactory because there are still people who get killed. " This argument depends on which year is chosen as a baseline.
Violence is down considerably from its peak in mid-2007, having ebbed in 2008, before Abhisit was elected. Violence has climbed and remained at a constant level since then. Nonetheless, in an attempt to assert a pre-election victory, Abhisit lifted the Emergency Decree in three districts in the south in late December 2010. Violence in those districts is indeed low, but it always has been. The overall level of violence in the south has not decreased. Indeed, the general secretary of the National Security Council tried to put a positive spin on a deteriorating situation in midMarch: "I concede that the violent unrest is increasing but our officials are determined to work to their utmost ability to resolve the problem. It is difficult to oversee such a wide area. Although fewer incidents occurred, they were more serious. " 4 In a trend evident throughout 2011, the number of attacks is down, but their lethality is up. 
Continued Violence: The New Normal
Violence in every category is down from its peak in mid-2007, though it has held steady since early 2009. 5 More important, the violence has settled into a pattern, with somewhat less indiscriminate violence than at the peak of the insurgency. Victims are targeted more intentionally, with many killings by insurgents in retaliation for abuses or extrajudicial killings by Thai security forces. Many people interviewed in mid-2010 and mid-2011 described the level of violence as "tolerable" and they have little expectation of it diminishing further.
Between December 2008 and June 2011, 949 people were killed and more than 1,700
wounded-a monthly average of 32 and 58, respectively. In 2007, four people a day were being killed, and eight were being wounded (see figure 1 ). fire extinguishers filled with ammonium nitrate-that is, things that can be procured easily and often for free. 7 There is a concern that the average size of IEDs may be increasing. was a backlash from Buddhist nurses and public employee unions. 9 In 2012, the cabinet also assigned 102 graduates in medicine, dentistry, and pharmacology who received government scholarships to positions in the three southern border provinces.
Explaining the Changing Levels of Violence
Violence is down from its 2007 peak, though the level of violence has stayed fairly steady since Third, the RTA is also taking the threat of Buddhist vigilantism very seriously. One case stands out. In June 2009, a mosque in Narathiwat's Cho-airong District was attacked by a group of gunmen, who killed 11 and wounded 12. Suspicion immediately fell on the RTA, which denied any involvement and argued that the attack was probably the work of militants trying to discredit the RTA and the government. A government spokesman asserted that it was a desperate act of the insurgents. In reality, Buddhist vigilantes perpetrated the attack. The suspects were members of the queen's village volunteer forces and had a lot of high-level supporters.
After detaining several of the suspected ringleaders, the RTA was pressured to release them. The RTA then leaked the name and photo of the ringleader, who then killed himself, as did another suspect whose photo was leaked. This sent a strong signal through the community, and since then, Buddhist vigilante attacks have sharply declined. Buddhist vigilantism both undermines the RTA's legitimacy and fuels a cycle of retaliatory violence. 
Democrat Party Policy Initiatives
The Abhisit government initiated only a few policies for resolving the conflict in the south, none of which were new, innovative, or bold. All had been attempted to some degree by preceding governments. These measures included some reforms in detention of suspects, negotiations with insurgents, development projects, and bureaucratic reorganization and attempts to civilianize government operations in the south. Overall, the insurgency was a low priority for The courts have ordered the release of more than 90 percent of detainees. Moreover, 43
percent of the 440 suspects in 238 cases that actually went to trial were acquitted. 17 This has infuriated the army, reducing its already questionable willingness to work with the police and producing more extrajudicial killings. The military got in trouble for holding detainees longer than 28 days by enrolling them in mandatory vocational training programs. Many were later released but not allowed to return to their communities. Many detainees were held 12 to 18 months without ever being charged and, in the absence of double jeopardy in Thai law, were often re-arrested upon release. As one legal defender stated, "The goal is not to find a real culprit, but to hold onto these people for as long as possible. " The military is no longer engaging in broad sweeps that 4 th Army officials admit were counterproductive. Thai officials insist that their intelligence has improved. The RTA also asserts that they often know where suspects are but may not have enough evidence to stand up in a court of law. 20 When an incident happens, the military or police have a much more specific idea of who is responsible, making large sweeps unnecessary. The last mass arrest was in October 2009, when police and soldiers raided the Saengtham Wittaya School in Narathiwat's Bacho district, detaining 60 students and religious teachers for questioning; only three had warrants.
There have also been some modest attempts to improve the legal process for detainees and suspects. These include the establishment of national security courts to expedite cases so that suspects do not languish in backlogged civilian criminal courts. The governor of Yala, Kritsada
Bunrat, implemented a pilot parole program for detainees held on flimsy charges. 21 Under the program, bail is arranged and suspects are placed under the recognizance of village headmen and religious leaders while awaiting trial. To date, the Thai army and security forces have prevented this pilot program from being implemented across the region.
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Despite some calls for it, the military has been able to quash a general amnesty and to impose so many conditions and restrictions on partial amnesties as to render them useless.
In an April 2011 meeting with ISOC, religious leaders in Narathiwat made a general amnesty one of their top demands. The RTA used general amnesties extremely effectively in the 1980s
and 1990s in dealing with a host of insurgencies throughout the country, although they are extremely unwilling to do so at this time. Gini coefficients-a quantitative metric that shows income inequality-of all four provinces are well below the national average, and Yala is one of the most inequitable provinces in the country. But to be fair, the UNDP sounds the alarm for inequality across Thailand, which it terms a "persistent" problem and a "worsening trend. " 31 The problem may be exacerbated rather than solved by THB63 billion in development funding. The real questions are who will spend those funds and how they will be spent. As it stands, the military's ISOC will be responsible for the disbursement of most funds. The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre only administers a handful of projects for education and reconciliation. The Abhisit government said it wanted a softer, development-oriented approach, but that policy was administered by the same security institution whose role the government sought to reduce.
Negotiations. Like the Thaksin and Surayud governments, the
There is also a legitimate concern over whom the funds will benefit. If funds are misappro- The one area where UNDP data shows the southern provinces really lagging is in education. This is partly due to insurgent efforts to kill and intimidate teachers, burn schools, and undermine the secular educational system. But the problem has deeper roots. In mid-2011, the education ministry allocated a budget of THB110 million to improve education in the deep south and halt the flood of students who drop out by the end of middle school, estimated to be more than 40,000 in the past few years. secretary-general will be able to discipline, and even dismiss, high-ranking officials including police. However, the law does not give SBPAC jurisdiction over prosecutors or judges or over military officers, who remain under the authority of the ISOC. 35 In the months following passage, the government did little to use the body to empower moderate Muslim leaders, who in the past have only served on the SBPAC's advisory panel. 36 It remains to be seen whether the new civilian agency will be able to wrest control of the THB63 billion in development funds from the military. While SBPAC will have nominal control of the south, few expect the 4 th Army or the ISOC to be fully accountable to civilian rule. Decree with the ISA in four districts of Songkhla, but that proposal was not acted on.
The government contends that the ISA allows security forces to retain some additional powers, such as the ability to detain people without charge for 7 days, while including somealbeit very weak-amnesty provisions that will promote reconciliation. Cynics saw this as a politically motivated policy, implemented to demonstrate security improvements before fiercely contested national elections. Others point to the fact that the ISA is draconian in its own right and has fundamentally eroded human and civil rights across the country since its passage. For them, the shift is just window dressing. 37 Lifting of the Emergency Decree has played well in the media, but it does not indicate a measurable improvement of the situation.
Violence, never high in those three districts, has fallen. But elsewhere, the rates of violence remain persistent.
Are the Reforms Enough? These reforms and initiatives were not bad policies, but they were insufficient to resolve the conflict. Even if welcomed by the local Malay community, they were seen as too little, too late. The government did not push for the reforms that could make a real difference and start to win the hearts and minds of the population: tackling the issues of security force immunity, legal reforms and the protection of defendant rights, and serious discussions about political autonomy. Such reforms would require the government to take on and overcome opposition from the military and security forces. However, the south was a low priority for the Democrat government, which was obsessed by the political threat posed by the Red Shirts and Thaksin's allies and unwilling to challenge the authority of the military, whom many saw to be the Democrats' patrons.
Allegations of torture by security forces persist. To date, more than 1,000 complaints have been brought before the national Human Rights Commission, with little result. Photographs documenting torture are admissible in court but carry little weight in judicial deliberations. The testimony of doctors is weighted highly, but Muslim lawyers complain that doctors are not allowed to examine suspects in a timely manner. Lawyers also argue that the Thai security forces have employed other coercive methods that make allegations of torture harder to prove. ise not to let anything like that happen again. " Nevertheless, the RTA worked assiduously to exonerate all involved. 39 The negative impact was compounded by General Prayuth's call for enhanced authorities for government forces, whom he said were at a disadvantage against guerrillas. Muslims in the south repeatedly warned me that until the issue of social justice is tackled, the insurgency cannot be quelled.
A test of the government's commitment to deal with the culture of security force impunity will be the upcoming trial in the Pattani provincial court of those accused of the death of a detained suspected insurgent, Sulaiman Naesa, who was found hanging in his cell at the Ingkhayutborihan military camp May 30, 2010, after being detained without charge 8 days prior.
The military claimed that the suspect took his own life, but his family alleges that his body had visible signs of torture and that the government was responsible for his death. Despite the trial date, few Muslims see any reason for optimism. Muslims in the south repeatedly warned me that until the issue of social justice is tackled, the insurgency cannot be quelled.
What Would Change the Equilibrium?
Although the Thai government increased resources, manpower, and funding for dealing with the insurgency, it currently remains a low priority for the Thai political and military elite.
The fact that the government and RTA officially label militants as "perpetrators of violence"
rather than "insurgents" says a lot about the government's own naiveté. It has neither the political will, nor the strategy, nor the tactics to defeat the insurgents decisively and negotiate The resolution of the situation in the south remains a low priority for the military, which is more concerned with elite politics in Bangkok and sees the south as a mere justification for increased budgets.
In short, the current low-level insurgency that the government and military are not committed to defeating-and that the insurgents are unwilling to escalate-will continue at a slow boil.
Impact of the July 2011 Elections
During the electoral campaign, the south was a minor issue for the two major parties. The
Democrats were confident of dominating the local seats and party lists, as the south has been one of their two electoral strongholds (the other being Bangkok). In the run-up to the election, opinion polls indicate that the Thai public saw the Democrats as better able to resolve the insurgency. The Democrats predicted that they would win at least 9 of the 11 seats in the 3 southern provinces, despite winning only 5 seats in 2007.
Yingluck Shinawatra, the new Pheu Thai leader and younger sister of Thaksin Shinawatra, made one prominent and well-received campaign swing in the south in mid-June. She offered a few policy initiatives, including greater public input into decisionmaking, increases in the number of Muslims who could go on the annual Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, and establishment of a "special administrative zone in the three southernmost border provinces. " However, she was very short on specifics. Though Sonthi is a Muslim himself, he is from the north and not an ethnic Malay, and is also suspect in the eyes of many southerners for his obeisance to the monarchy.
The election results in the south were not a surprise. Although the opposition Pheu Thai won an outright majority at the national level, 265 seats out of 500, compared to the Democrats' 159 seats (the remainder going to 9 other parties), 42 Pheu Thai did not win a single seat in the deep south. The Democrat Party won 9 of 11 seats, with Matubhum and Bhum Jai Thai winning one each. It was a stinging rebuke for Pheu Thai and its leader, Yingluck Shinawatra, and does not bode well for her government in developing new policies or garnering broad public support. She will lead a 6-party coalition government, giving her an ample majoritymore than 300 seats-but she will not have an easy time in formulating any new policies in the south.
Nor will the prime minister have an easy time with the RTA leadership, who were outspokenly pro-Democrat during the campaign. General Chan-ocha even warned the general public in a televised speech not to vote for "bad people," a thinly veiled reference to Pheu While the RTA leadership has pledged to respect the election results, it does not mean that they will make life easy for Yingluck. This will be even more the case if she uses her majority to push through a parliamentary amnesty for her brother, allowing him to return from exile.
She has made "national reconciliation" her top priority, which in the RTA's eyes is a code word for returning her brother to the country and releasing jailed Red Shirt activists. In terms of policies, she is unlikely to distance herself from her brother, and that too will infuriate the RTA leadership.
Like the PPP government of Samak Sundaravej that ruled from February to December 2008, Prime Minister Yingluck has to be constantly concerned that the military, while "respecting" electoral results, will put pressure on the coalition partners and individual Pheu Thai members of parliament to defect to the opposition. While this will be harder to accomplish as Pheu Thai itself won an absolute majority, the defection of coalition members will make governing a greater challenge for Pheu Thai.
Similarly, her government will be unable and unwilling to challenge the military in its handling of the south, which will remain a very low priority. Despite her campaign pledge for a special administrative zone in the south that has significant local backing, Prime Minister Yingluck is astute enough to know that any form of autonomy for the three provinces is an absolute nonstarter for the military and will therefore go unpursued. 43 She is very unlikely to call on the military to hold itself accountable for abuses in the south, or push to lift the Emergency Decree or ISA or amend the laws that give security forces blanket immunity.
There are a few things Yingluck can do. She should not follow her brother's lead. Thaksin Shinawatra punished regions that did not vote for his party by starving them of development funds. Yingluck should maintain the moral high ground and continue to support the Democrat government's attempt to civilianize SBPAC and its control over development projects. She can also push for some limited legal reforms regarding detainees. But these are very small steps.
Implications for U.S. Policy
The insurgency in southern Thailand is a low-level concern for U.S. policymakers and security planners. Despite past concern over Thailand's handling of the insurgency, fears have the reality is that a significant amount of ungoverned space continues to exist in the heart of insular Southeast Asia.
The most important immediate U.S. objective in Thailand is political stability at the national level and deepening bilateral economic ties. Absent a cohesive Thai government with the political will to overcome military resistance to policies that might address underlying causes of the insurgency, U.S. pressure to do more is likely to be ineffective or even counterproductive. Accordingly, the United States should maintain quiet diplomatic pressure on the government to continue its counterinsurgency efforts and offer any requested intelligence and law enforcement assistance, while being cognizant of Thai sensitivity over its sovereignty. 
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